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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I, Defective Information. Defendant/appellant's 
brief addressed the constitutional requirements of a legally 
sufficient information and the the disposition that should be 
made of a defective or legally insufficient information. Plain-
tiff's answer brief completely ignores the consitutional re-
quirements, and relies only on the minimum requirements imposed 
by statutory law and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Plaintiff 
makes no effort to respond to defendant's constitutional argu-
ments. Defendant feels that his position has been adequately set 
forth in his original brief and has nothing more to add at this 
point. 
Point II. Double Jeopardy. The proceedings in this case 
subsequent to the appeal clearly indicate the iniquity inflicted 
upon defendant by virtue of the second trial and sentence. 
Defendant had completed his probation after the first trial and 
been released from probation. The Court imposed an additional 
term of probation after the second trial and then threatened 
defendant with sanctions for alleged violation of that probation 
for failure to register as a sex offender (R-II-161). The pro-
ceedings speak for themselves. Defendant has been twice punished 
for the same offenses. 
Points III and IV. Speedy Trial - Failure to Dismiss. 
r 
Plaintiff goes into considerable detail misrepresenting the re-
cord, transcripts and proceedings in this matter, alleging that 
1 
(a) defendant never demanded a speedy trial, (b) defendant never 
moved for dismissal when the State appeared at the January 4, 
1995, trial unprepared and seeking a continuance, and (c) that 
defendant himself sought the continuance at the January 4f hear-
ing. All of the foregoing representations are belied by the 
record, as more fully set forth hereinafter. 
Point V. Suppression of Evidence. The possiblity that 
the Court would admit the suppressed testimony of the officers 
concerning defendant's sexual problems imposed such a risk of in-
flaming or prejudicing the jury against him (as it had done in 
the first trial) that it precluded him from taking the stand to 
answer in the negative to one simple question: "Did you do it?" 
Point VI. Untimely Mption to Admit Video Interview. Use 
of the video was untimely, contrary to previous representations 
of plaintiff's counsel, and prejudicial to defendant. 
Point VII. Failure to Give Eye-Witness Cautionary In-
struction. This issue is adequately covered in appellant's 
original brief and nothing new is added at this time. 
Point VIII. Insufficient Evidence. The statements con-
. i . . f , . , i 
tained on page 25 of the plaintiff's brief referencing page 115 
of the trial transcript that Amber Olsen identified defendant at 
the time of the crime and that he was identified by the mass of 
hair on his chest is totally without support in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED 
THE INFORMATION AS DEFECTIVE 
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Defendant/appellant's brief addressed the constitutional 
requirements of a legally sufficient information and the the dis-
position that should be made of a defective or legally in-
sufficient information. Plaintiff's answer brief completely 
ignores the consitutional requirements, and relies only on the 
minimum requirements imposed by statutory law and the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Plaintiff makes no effort to respond to 
defendant's constitutional arguments. Defendant feels that his 
position has been adequately set forth in his original brief and, 
other than to point out that plaintiff did not respond to defend-
ant's constitutional arguments, has nothing more to add at this 
point. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
CHARGES AS CONSTITUTING DOUBLE JEOPARDY, i.e. MULTIPLE 
PUNISHMENTS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE 
Plaintiff's counsel, admitting confusion, argues on page 
7 of his brief that the court did not, as part of its sentence, 
require defendant to register as a sex offender. While that is 
technically true, the court treated the defendant as though his 
sentence did include a requirement that he register as a sex 
offender. See the court's order to show cause (R-II-161). 
Plaintiff's counsel goes on to say that defendant's claim of 
double jeopardy could arguably prevent the State from pursuing a 
probation violation, but that such an argument should not entitle 
defendant to dismissal. The proceedings in this case subsequent 
to sentence and appeal clearly vindicate defendant's claim of 
3 
double jeopardy. Defendant had completed his probation after the 
first trial and been released from probation. The Court imposed 
an additional term of probation after the second trial and then 
threatened defendant with sanctions for alleged violation of that 
probation for failure to register as a sex offender (R-II-161) . 
The proceedings speak for themselves. Defendant has been twice 
punished for the same offenses. 
Point III 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
(a) Utilizing the balancing test argued by plaintiff in 
its answer brief, it becomes clear that under State vs. Trafny, 
799 P.2d. 704 (Utah 1990), and Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972) defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. In 
Trafny, the Utah court said that a period of 161 days, i.e. a 
little over 5 months, would, at first blush, appear to be a 
prejudicial violation, but that the period of the delay must be 
viewed in the light of the totality of the circumstances. Looked 
at that way, the 19 month delay chargeable to the State in the 
instant case certainly is an unconstitutional delay unless, 
viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, the delay 
falls within constitutional limits. 
(b) Looking at the next factor, the reason for the 
delay, it is equally obvious that defendant's trial has been un-
constitutional delayed. As reviewed on pages 20, 21 and 22 of 
defendant's original brief, the State was continually unprepared, 
not only after appeal and remand for a new trial, but even going 
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back to the very first trial date set in this matter of May 21, 
1992. After remand on August 27, 1993, trial was scheduled for 
April 19, 1994 (R-23) , and continued to July 28 and 29, at the 
behest of the State because they were unprepared (one of their 
witnesses would not be available) (R-23). All of the time from 
August 27, 1993, is chargeable against the State and in derroga-
tion of defendant's right to a speedy trial. United States vs. 
Carini (CA2 NY) 562 F2d 144; United States vs. New Buffalo 
Amusement Corp. (CA2 NY) 600 F2d 368, 78 ALR3d 297. 
Unavailability of defendant's counsel was the reason for 
rescheduling the trial from July 28, to the latter part of 
December (R-20, 30A). Although defendant has not counted this 
time in calculating the 19 months delay, defendant contends that 
part of that time should appropriately be chargeable against the 
State because of its efforts to have defense counsel thrown off 
the case. Thus we see that the reasons for the delay were insti-
tutional delay, requests for continuance by the State because it 
was continually unprepared, and the State's efforts to disqualify 
defendant's counsel. Defendant had no part in, nor responsi-
bility for, the 19 month delay. 
(c) Next we look at defendant's assertion of his rights. 
Plaintiff erroneously alleges (page 11 of its brief) that defend-
ant never raised the issue of speedy trial, never asserted that 
right, that the record is "completely void" of any assertion of 
his right to a speedy trial, but that it was he who, in fact, 
chose to seek a continuance of the January 4, 1995, trial date. 
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That contention is false and totally rebutted by the proceedings 
that took place on January 4, as well as throughout the whole of 
the proceedings in this case. On page 4 of the transcript of 
proceedings at the January 4f hearing (TIV-4), plaintiff's coun-
sel, Jeffrey R. Burbank, states, beginning with Line 14, that he 
filed the motion to use the trial transcript and that he "also 
filed the motion in the alternative to continue . . . " It was 
plaintiff who asked the court to allow the State to use the trial 
transcript from the first trial, or, in the alternative, to 
continue. On page 5, lines 19 through 25, defense counsel 
opposed the requested continuance and asked for dismissal as 
follows: "We oppose the motion to continue . . . We request that 
either the case go forward today or ask the Court to dismiss the 
case with prejudice." On page 6, lines 8 - 10, Mr. Perry said: 
"The case has been a long time, I think we should just proceed 
with the trial or in the alternative have the court dismiss it". 
On page 9, lines 2, 3 and 4, defense counsel states the he cannot 
proceed based upon use of the prior trial transcript and con-
cludes: "However, I do in no way consent to a continuance." Over 
the strenuous objection of the defendant, it was the Court that 
granted the plaintiff's motion to continue (TIV-10). In the face 
of the foregoing record, and in a weak and fruitless effort to 
support his position to the contrary, plaintiff's counsel, admit-
ting to his confusion, cites this court to an ambiguous (at 
best), confusing, garbled, and unfinished comment of by the 
trial judge at the time of sentencing and hearing on defendant's 
motion for new trial some 7 months later: 
"As far as the lack of a speedy trial is concerned, 
I think there's sufficient, and I was the Judge who 
handled the mattter when the subpoenaed witnesses 
didn't appear at the last trial setting, and I offered 
the only thing we could do, I felt under the circum-
stances would be to go ahead and proceed, and 1 appre-
ciate the fact that your client was under somewhat 
duress, he had one of two choices, neither one of which 
were very palatable ^ rhose circumstances11. 
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gation of defendant's right to a speedy trial, and that the 
defendant has vigorously and repeatedly, asserted his rights, we 
now direct our attention to the fourth and last prong of the four 
prong test, the question of prejudice to the defendant. Pre-
judice to the defendant is not confined merely to prejudice in 
the presentation of his defense which the defendant may suffer as 
a result of the delay. Prejudice also consists of the un-
certainty, anxiety, continued attention in the press, humili-
ation, loss of employment, financial distress, and etc., all of 
which defendant has experienced in this case. If that not be so, 
how does one explain 77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, which provides 
that an incarcerated defendant should be tried within 30 days of 
arraignment? The only explanation is that the legislature wished 
to minimize the emotional and physical toll, the financial hard-
ship, and other inconveniences that prolonged incarceration would 
entail. One would be hard pressed to argue that the intent of the 
30 day requirement was to facilitate preparation of the defense 
of the accused. 
On the other hand, and quite apart from such physical, 
emotional and financial hardships suffered by defendant, he has 
also been prejudiced in his defense and/or the outcome of the 
trial. Had the trial been held in August or September of 1993, or 
even the first part of 1994, it is conceivable that the vic-
tim/witnesses would have had a better recollection of the events 
surrounding the incident, in which case the prejudicial video 
tape of Nicolee Olsen which contained two references to prior 
8 
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motion to dismiss. See Point III hereinafter. Being an integral 
part of the denial of defendant's constitutional and statutory 
right to a speedy trial, the "only possible remedy" is dismissal 
of the charges and discharge of the defendant. See Strunk vs. 
United States, 412 US 434, 37 L.Ed 2d 56, 93 S.Ct. 2260. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The most essential element of defendant's claim of preju-
dice by virtue of the Court's refusal to suppress all admissions 
of the defendant for any purpose, including impeachment, is some-
what difficult to establish from the record. During off the 
record discussions regarding this point in chambers with counsel 
and the court just prior to the commencement of the trial on June 
2, the Court admonished defense counsel that if the defendant 
were to take the stand, all testimony concerning his admissions 
would be admissible for impeachment purposes, subject only to 
objections that might be made when the testimony was offered, 
even though defendant proposed to take the stand merely to deny 
the act in response to one proposed question, "Did you do it?". A 
careful review of the testimony of the officers about defendant's 
sexual proclivities, emotional state, and activities immediately 
proceeding the incident will reveal absolutely no admission by 
defendant that he did it. Defendant did not propose to take the 
stand and say anything contrary to what he had already admitted. 
But the trial court would not rule the admissions inadmissible, 
even though there was nothing in them that would contradict such 
10 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED'BY ADMITTING THE VIDEO 
OF THE INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEW OF NICOLEE OLSEN 
Under date of May 3, 1995, defendant submitted his re-
quest for discovery pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Interrogatory #10 asked the plaintiff to identify 
each exhibit that the prosecution reasonably expected to intro-
duce at the trial (RII-67) . The plaintiff refused to answer 
(RII-79) . That refusal, coupled with previous representation of 
Mr. Wyatt that "We have no evidence that we haven't used before 
(Transcript of the May 23, 1995, hearing, page 15, line 24) and 
the untimely motion of the plaintiff coming at the time of trial, 
is more than enough reason to hold the plaintiff to a reasonable 
standard of fair play and deny its motion to introduce the 
video. Contrary to what plaintiff alleges on page 20 of the 
answer brief, the video was shown before Nicolee testified, not 
after. Also, in the critical areas of identification of the 
defendant, her live testimony and that of the video differed 
markedly. See page 39 of defendant's brief. Without the video 
the plaintiff would have been left with Nicolee1s testimony that 
(a) she identified defendant in court merely because he had been 
pointed out as the defendant and was sitting at the table with 
defense counsel, (b) she had not recognized him when she passed 
him in the hallway, (c) she could not describe his appearence 
when she saw "him" on the porch in 1992, (d) and she would not 
have known him if she had seen him walking down the sidewalk. See 
pages 39 and 40 of defendant's original brief for further dis-
cussion of the differences in her live testimony and what she 
12 
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THE COURT ERRRED BY F A I L I N G TO G I V E A REQUESTED 
CAUTIONARY I N S T R U C T I O N TO THE JURY REGARDING 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF N I C O L E E AND AMBER OLSEN 
Thin i.>>in' i", iiipquji-M i y c fwi ' r ed i n a p p e l l a n t ' s o r i g i n a l 
b r i e f and n o t h i n q new i s added a t t h i s t i me. 
POINT V I I I 
INR TJP F T CIENT EV1DENCE 
P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s Ln t h e a n s w e r b r i e l : t h d t d e f e n d a n t has 
f a i l e d t o m a r s h a l i a l l t h e e v i d e n c e . C o u n s e l i s a t a l o s s t o 
1 3 
understand what more he should have done. Would plaintiff have 
defense counsel reprint the entire trial transcript? So far as 
counsel is aware, he has pointed out every piece of relevant 
evidence that would lead to identification of the defendant which 
is necessary before he can be convicted as the perpetrator. Mr. 
Wyatt alleges (page 25 of his brief) that defendant was identi-
fied as the perpetrator of the crime and refers to page 115 of the 
trial transcript. Plaintiff cites nothing else that should have 
been included in defendant's "marshalling" of the evidence. 
Defendant addressed Amber's testimony in detail, including her 
testimony on page 115, in his original appeal brief, pages 40 and 
41. Plaintiff's statement on page 25 of its brief that "appel-
lant was also identified by his body, which the children recog-
nized by the mass of hair on the appellant's chest" is unsupport-
ed by any reference to the record and is, in fact, contrary to the 
testimony presented. Defendant is bemused by plaintiff's attempt 
to strengthen its argument by reference to evidence not before 
the jury (brief pages 25 and 26). 
Stretching credibility to its extremes, one cannot find 
any evidence linking defendant to the incident to any greater 
degree of certainty than linking defendant's roommate to the 
incident. He was convicted simply because he was the one 
standing trial. The evidence before the jury is just as compel-
ling to convict defendant's roommate, had he been the one charged 
and tried before the jury. 
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